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NATIONHOOD AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
THE DUTCH REPUBLIC:
AN EXAMINATION OF GROTIUS’
ANTIQUITY OF THE BATAVIAN REPUBLIC
Ethan Alexander-Davey1,2
Abstract: The emphasis in contemporary democratic theory and in the history of
political thought on the ‘natural rights’ theory of popular sovereignty of Locke,
precursors of which are found in the work of Hugo Grotius and others, obscures
an important relationship between constitutional self-government and nationalism.
Through an examination of the early political writings of Grotius, especially his
Antiquity of the Batavian Republic, this essay shows how a national consciousness
forged out of memories of native traditions of self-government, and stories of heroic
ancestors who successfully defended those traditions against usurpers and tyrants, gives
concrete substance to otherwise inchoate theories of constitutional self-government.
Keywords: Hugo Grotius, the Dutch Republic, the Dutch Revolt, nationalism,
nationhood, national identity, constitutionalism, the ancient constitution, mixed con-
stitution, self-government, popular sovereignty, liberty.
Introduction
Nationalism has fallen into disrepute since the end of the Second World War.
Motivated by the horrors perpetrated by the Nazi regime, Jürgen Habermas,
while acknowledging the ‘umbilical links’ of modern democracy to national
consciousness, has promoted the formation of post-national identities and tra-
ditions for the grounding of constitutional self-government.3 John Rawls, too,
turned to Kantian universals in his formulation of a liberal democratic con-
ception of justice. Such attempts to purge constitutional self-government of
its putatively ‘contingent’ relationship with nationalism have, perhaps, been
made to appear more plausible by the manner in which prominent scholars of
the history of political thought present the development of modern political
thought, as a process that leads teleologically to John Locke’s universalist,
natural rights based theory of constitutional government. The purpose of this
article is to examine the ways in which nationalism has been supportive of
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. Vol. XXXVIII. No. 1. Spring 2017
1 Department of Politics, University of Virginia, 1540 Jefferson Park Avenue,
Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA. Email: ea8x@virginia.edu
2 I am much obliged to Richard Avramenko and anonymous referees for their com-
ments on earlier drafts of this article.
3 See Habermas, ‘The European Nation State: Its Achievements and Its Limitations:
On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship’, Ratio Juris, 9 (1996),
pp. 125–37. See also these useful commentaries on Habermasian constitutional patriot-
ism: Clarissa Hayward, ‘Democracy’s Identity Problem: Is ‘Constitutional Patriotism’
the Answer?’, Constellations, 14 (2007), pp.182–96; Jan-Werner Muller, Constitutional
Patriotism (Princeton, 2007).
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GROTIUS’ ANTIQUITY OF THE BATAVIAN REPUBLIC 65
self-government and the preservation of liberty. I show that Hugo Grotius’
The Antiquity of the Batavian Republic provides a powerful illustration of the
importance of national feelings, national memory and nationalist rhetoric in
making arguments for popular sovereignty tenable, and in engendering popu-
lar attachment to particular constitutional forms and the rights they are sup-
posed to protect.
This, it should be noted, is but one example of a pattern that one encounters
in the pro-constitutionalist writing of several European or European-based
nations, including England, France and even the United States.4 I choose the
Netherlands and Grotius’ tract about the Batavians because they are the most
neglected in the literature. This article proceeds in three parts. First, I explore
what is lacking in universalist accounts of constitutional self-government.
Second, I describe the genesis of the Batavian narrative, and the historical
context in which Grotius wrote his defence of the government of the Dutch
Republic. Third, I show how Grotius’ account of the ties among the Dutch
people and the history of their institutions supplies the deficiencies of theories
of popular sovereignty and constitutionalism based on the natural rights of
individuals.
I
Nationhood and Self-Government
As several scholars have shown, there is a logical and historical relationship
between constitutionalism and popular sovereignty on the one hand, and
nationalism on the other. As liberal nationalists have argued, constitutional
self-government may depend on many conditions that only nationhood can
provide, to wit: a sense of the extent of the political community, a source of
unity, solidarity and continuity transcending common territory and shared
procedures, and a clear image of the pre-political community to which gov-
ernments are accountable, and to which power reverts when governments
betray their trust.5 I illustrate this complex relationship through an examina-
tion of the most detailed and ultimately the most popular seventeenth-century
4 For an early nationalist French argument for popular sovereignty and consti-
tutionalism, see Francois Hotman, Francogallia, ed. and trans. R. Geisey and H. Salmon
(Cambridge, 1972). For a Scottish example, see H.R. Trevor-Roper, George Buchanan
and the Ancient Scottish Constitution (London, 1966). English examples abound: see,
most recently, E. Alexander-Davey, ‘Constitutional Self-Government and Nationalism:
Hobbes, Locke and George Lawson’, History of Political Thought, 35 (2014),
pp. 458–84. The founding of the United States owed much to the colonists’ memories of
England’s national past. See T. Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and
the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution (Indianapolis, 1998).
5 See M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham, 1996); Y. Tamir,
Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, 1993); B. Yack, ‘Popular Sovereignty and National-
ism’, Political Theory, 29 (2001), pp. 517–36; B. Yack, ‘The Myth of the Civic Nation’,
Critical Review, 10 (1996), pp. 193–211.
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defence of Dutch constitutionalism, Grotius’ Antiquity of the Batavian Repub-
lic, with references, where necessary, to other works composed by Grotius in
same period, namely the Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (De Jure
Praedae), Commentarius in Theses XI and The Annals, and History of the
Low-Country Wars (De Rebus Belgicis). In the accounts of Quentin Skinner,
Richard Tuck, E.H. Kossman and Martin van Gelderen, the first text in
particular, if mentioned at all, is given short shrift. However, this is entirely
understandable given that these authors are concerned primarily with charting
the advance of natural law theories of the state.6 E.H. Kossmann, for instance,
dismisses Grotius’ Batavian tract because it does not point in the direction of
the individualistic natural law theory of popular sovereignty, which is for
him, as for his English colleagues, the telos, the great achievement of moder-
nity, whose origins need to be explained.7 More recent scholarship on Grotius
also focuses on the Dutch philosopher’s contribution to the development of
theories of natural law, natural rights and the implications of these theories for
civil and international relations, and for colonialism.8 Some attention has
been drawn to those works of Grotius, including the Antiquity, that do not fit
the portrait of him as ‘the patron saint’ of international justice and peace, or of
theories of natural law, but instead place him in ‘the republican tradition of
Tacitism and . . . Monarchomach political ideas’.9
I focus on this particular text for two reasons. In the first place, whatever
the normative merits or demerits of the Lockean theory of the state and its
66 E. ALEXANDER-DAVEY
6 Quentin Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume 2 (Cam-
bridge, 1978); Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development
(Cambridge, 1982). Tuck mentions Grotius’ use of the Batavian myth as a ‘symbol of
aristocratic republicanism’ in Philosophy and Government 1572–1651 (Cambridge,
1993), pp. 164–6, but even there it is a brief stop along the way to the ‘great natural law
theories of the mid-century’.
7 E.H. Kossmann, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic: Three Studies (Amster-
dam, 2000), p. 32.
8 Cf. M. van Gelderen, ‘Freedom Fighters: The Act of Abjuration, Hugo Grotius and
the Dutch Debates on Liberty’, in The Act of Abjuration: Inspired and Inspirational, ed.
P. Brood and R. Kubben (Tilburg, 2011), pp. 155–68; K. Haakonssen, ‘Hugo Grotius and
the History of Political Thought’, Political Theory, 10 (1985), pp. 239–65; J. Salter,
‘Hugo Grotius: Property and Consent’, Political Theory, 29 (2001), pp. 537–55; Maria
Luisa Pesante, ‘Slaves, Servants and Wage Earners: Free and Unfree Labour from
Grotius to Blackstone’, History of European Ideas, 35 (2009), pp. 289–320; Martine
Julia van Ittersum, ‘The Wise Man is Never Merely a Private Citizen: The Roman Stoa in
Hugo Grotius’ De Jure Praedae (1604–1608)’, History of European Ideas, 36 (2010),
pp. 1–18; Martine Julia van Ittersum, ‘The Long Goodbye: Hugo Grotius’ Justification
of Dutch Expansion Overseas, 1615–1645’, History of European Ideas, 36 (2010),
pp. 386–411; Martin van Gelderen, ‘ “Iustitiam non include”: Carl Schmitt, Hugo
Grotius and the Ius Publicum Europaeum’, History of European Ideas, 37 (2011), pp.
154–9.
9 Jan Waszink, ‘Lipsius and Grotius: Tacitism’, History of European Ideas, 39
(2013), pp. 151–68.
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Dutch analogues, it is important to understand, as an empirical, historical
question, what sorts of arguments and appeals helped to bring about the first
victory of constitutional self-government in early-modern Europe.10 The con-
stitutionalist pamphlet literature of the Dutch Revolt (c.1568–85) is domi-
nated by arguments based on customary or common law, together with
appeals to the memory of ‘courageous’ and ‘free’ ancestors who, owing to
their national solidarity and their virtue, were able to exercise a legislative
power locally through their provincial States, and nationally through the
States General, and jealously guarded their rights and liberties from all
would-be usurpers. In all of this, natural law theories of the state receive far
less emphasis.11 Secondly, it is important to acknowledge that the establish-
ment of a constitutionally limited government poses questions that a natural
rights theory is hard-pressed to answer, namely what is the concrete commu-
nity that claims to have a right to govern itself in accordance with a particular
constitutional discipline, and what is the form of its constitution? One has to
know who the people are, what the community of sentiment is within which
men owe special duties to one another, within which there is indeed a com-
mon good to be sought. There must also be some common basis for agreement
on the constitutional form and the basic laws. Abstract reasoning can lead in a
thousand different directions. But national experience and national prejudices
can provide a common ground. A tract such as Grotius’ Antiquity gives bold,
clear and emotionally evocative answers to these questions, based on asser-
tions about the national history and national character, in this case, of the
Dutch people.
My claim is that Grotius’ national-historical tract on the origins of the
Dutch people and their constitution provided something fundamentally more
important for the development of modern constitutional self-government than
anything in his more celebrated mature works.12 No other work of Grotius was
published in a pocket-book format or reprinted as many times in the
10 For instance, Kossman calls Locke’s Dutch contemporary Willem vander Muelen
‘the Dutch Locke’ and analyses his work at length. However, even at this time, a century
after the Netherlands won independence and established itself as a republic, arguments
from custom and national myth were as pervasive as ever: for instance, Adrian Houtuyn’s
Republicae Batavae liber primus, published in the same decade as vander Muelen’s
works, which Kossmann mentions but does not discuss.
11 This, at least, is the impression created by the most thorough study of the pamphlet
literature of the Dutch Revolt to date: Martin van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the
Dutch Revolt 1555–1590 (Cambridge, 1992). Moreover, by van Gelderen’s account,
arguments based on national custom far outweigh religious arguments for constitu-
tionalism. On the whole Protestants themselves approved resistance against the Spanish
authorities not on theological, but on constitutional grounds. See ibid., p. 94.
12 As Richard Tuck rightly observes, the relevant chapters of Grotius’ most cele-
brated work, De iure belli ac pacis, are logically consistent with his earlier republican
writings, but by themselves they are of little use to one who wishes to understand republi-
can liberty in general or Dutch constitutionalism in particular. In Book I, which contains
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vernacular.13 Significantly, this text does not endow individuals with ‘natural’
or ‘human’ rights. In a sense, Grotius’ Antiquity rhetorically reconstitutes a
mere ‘multitude’ as a ‘nation’. It is written from the point of view of one ‘re-
minding’ his own people of something ‘forgotten’, that they are the descen-
dants of ancestors who possessed a coherent political community, who loved
liberty and tolerated kings only to the extent that the latter procured the com-
mon good and protected their liberty as a people. The ancestors, Grotius
argues, had from the beginning a settled way of sharing the sovereign power
of the nation among its various estates, and guaranteed their fellow subjects
certain rights, which were understood to inhere in them not as human beings,
but as members of a particular national community of common place, blood
and custom.
None of these claims about the national past would meet the standards of
modern historiography. But even if such stories can be shown by modern his-
torians to be mostly fictional, that does not mean that writers can invent effec-
tive political narratives ex nihilo, or even that such writers are aware that they
are engaged in an act of mythopoesis. As Rogers Smith notes ‘forms of politi-
cal peoplehood . . . are largely generated, motivated, and also meaningfully
limited by the particular range of stories of possible political identity that they
have inherited and long valued’.14 In other words, political actors are con-
strained, to a significant degree, to work with narratives that are already
familiar, both to themselves and to their intended audience. Grotius, as I
show, did not manufacture Dutch national memory out of whole cloth; he
appealed to stories that had already long been in wide circulation, and adapted
them to inspire popular attachment to a particular constitutional order.
What this examination suggests, more broadly, is that just as popular sover-
eignty may require recourse to the nation as a historic community, so may
constitutionalism depend on reference to ancestral institutions. Both are in a
relationship with the nation as an ‘inheritance’ shared by members of the
68 E. ALEXANDER-DAVEY
chapters treating sovereignty and the right of resistance, Grotius explicitly mentions the
Netherlands only once, in a footnote. Claiming to answer the question ‘to whom the Sov-
ereign Power in every Nation belongs’ in Chapter III, he offers arguments that establish
absolute monarchy to be not only a legitimate form of government as such, but one that is
preferable to its alternatives in most circumstances. See Tuck, Philosophy and Govern-
ment, pp. 193–4, and Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck (Indian-
apolis, 2005), especially Book I, Chapters III and IV.
13 On the pocket-book editions of the text, see Tuck, Philosophy and Government,
p. 164. Composed in Latin, the text was immediately translated into Dutch on publication
in 1610. The Dutch translation was reprinted in 1636, 1639, 1641 and twice in 1651. A
second translation was published in 1681 and reprinted in a work called Antiquitates
Germanicae in 1714, 1728, 1756 and 1757. See Jan Waszink, ‘Introduction’, in Hugo
Grotius, The Antiquity of the Batavian Republic, ed. and trans. Jan Waszink (Assen,
2000), pp. 31–2.
14 Rogers Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Mem-
bership (Cambridge, 2003), p. 48.
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GROTIUS’ ANTIQUITY OF THE BATAVIAN REPUBLIC 69
political community, a ‘heritage compounded of ethnic, political, cultural and
other elements’.15 In any event, as van Gelderen has recently shown, this con-
tinues to be the the case in the Netherlands, where the two largest political par-
ties explicitly appeal to the legacy of the Dutch Revolt and the Dutch
Republic, and to the memory of Dutch philosophers, such as Grotius, who
took up their pens in defence of Dutch freedom and independence.16 This is
not to accuse Habermas or Rawls of proposing alternatives that are impos-
sible, but only to question their rejection of a resource that history has shown
to be very useful for the promotion of liberty and constitutionalism, and also,
with this broader historical view in mind, to raise doubts about the ‘intrinsic’
relationship that Habermas sees between a people’s attachment to national
traditions and the calamities witnessed in the twentieth century.17
Some may object that the term ‘nationalism’ is not suitable for a discussion
of the realities of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Dutch politics in gen-
eral, or the political theory of Hugo Grotius in particular. Yet there are good
reasons to believe that they are. Although the term ‘nationalism’ was coined
in the nineteenth century, many scholars argue that the phenomenon itself is
much older, that the general thesis advanced by Eric Hobsbawm, Ernst
Gellner and Benedict Anderson is in fact a ‘modernist fallacy’.18 As Adrian
Hastings writes ‘Hobsbawm wrote a history of nineteenth- and twentieth-
century nationalism, but not a history of nationalism, and denial of the first
half of the story has inevitably skewed the whole’.19 The same might well be said
of the work of Gellner and Anderson. Nationalism scholars such as Hastings,
Steven Grosby and Anthony D. Smith prove the modernist thesis wrong by
documenting ancient, medieval and early-modern nations and nationalisms.
Hastings argues that national consciousness in medieval Europe arose from
the example of the Hebrew nation in the Bible and generally from a Christian
understanding of the world as a world of nations. This national consciousness
15 Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, p. 72.
16 van Gelderen, ‘Freedom Fighters’, pp. 155–6.
17 Jurgen Habermas, ‘Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity: The
Federal Republic’s Orientation to the West’, J. Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cul-
tural Criticism and the Historians’ Debate, ed. and trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen
(Cambridge MA, 1989), p. 251.
18 The chief works of the ‘modernists’ are E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism
since 1780 (Cambridge, 2012); E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, 1983);
B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (London, 2006). The ‘modernist fallacy’ is refuted
in several studies by Anthony D. Smith, especially: The Ethnic Origins of Nations
(Oxford, 1988); Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge, 1995); The Cul-
tural Foundations of Nations (Oxford, 2008). Also by A. Hastings in The Construction of
Nationhood (Cambridge, 2006); and S. Grosby, ‘Nationalism and Social Theory: The
Distinction between Community and Society’, in Routledge International Handbook of
Contemporary Social and Political Theory, ed. G. Delanty and S.P. Turner (New York,
2001), pp. 280–9.
19 Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood, p. 11.
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reached not only local elites, but also the general population, as the ideas were
regularly expressed in church, which all classes attended. Some of these
scholars, such as Hastings and Greenfeld, identify England as the first country
to exhibit modern nationalism.20 Philip Gorski, however, argues that this hon-
our belongs to the Netherlands.21 Others attempt to draw historical and nor-
mative distinctions between patriotism, or ‘civic nationalism’, and ethnic
nationalism, but reality is generally messier than such typologies would sug-
gest.22 Anthony D. Smith’s definition of nationalism as ‘an ideological move-
ment for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of
a population’ is, as I will demonstrate, certainly consistent with the aspira-
tions expressed in Grotius’ tract, though it does not fully encompass them.23
Grotius appeals for national unity and loyalty to a particular sovereign and
independent Dutch order against those who would impose foreign constitu-
tional models.
It should also be noted that the nationalism described by some modernists
differs substantively in certain ways from the early-modern nationalism of
which I speak here. For instance, Istvan Hont asserts that there are two views
of modern nationalism. The first, the more conventional one espoused by
Gellner and Hobsbawm, is that nationalism begins with the schemes of
national homogenization pursued by the Assemblée National during the
French Revolution. The second, he says, is that nationalism begins with the
age of absolutism, the period of state-building by centralizing monarchical
regimes.24 In both conceptions of nationalism, the state, whether a monarch or
a representative assembly, is understood to be engaged in making a nation out
of a population that is not yet sufficiently ‘national’, not yet sufficiently
homogeneous. One of the more extreme forms of this nationalizing state is
seen, for instance, in Emmanuel Sieyes’ proposal to liquidate, re-divide and
70 E. ALEXANDER-DAVEY
20 Ibid., p. 32; Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge
MA, 1992).
21 Philip Gorski, ‘The Mosaic Moment: An Early Modernist Critique of Modernist
Theories of Nationalism’, American Journal of Sociology, 100 (2000), pp. 1428–68,
p. 1433.
22 For attempts to disaggregate ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’, see Maurizio Viroli,
For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism (Oxford, 1995); J.H.
Schaar, ‘The Case for Patriotism’, in J.H. Schaar, Legitimacy in the Modern State (New
Brunswick NJ, 1981). The flaws in this approach are discussed in Canovan, Nationhood
and Political Theory; Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations; Rogers Smith, Stories of
Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership (Cambridge, 1999);
Bernard Yack, ‘Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism’, Political Theory, 29 (2001),
pp. 517–36.
23 Smith, Cultural Foundations of Nations, p. 15.
24 Istvan Hont, ‘The Permanent Crisis of a Divided Mankind: “Contemporary Crisis
of the Nation State” in Historical Perspective’, Political Studies, 42 issue supplement
(1994), pp. 166–231, p. 217.
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
16
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
GROTIUS’ ANTIQUITY OF THE BATAVIAN REPUBLIC 71
homogenize the old provinces of France.25 The early-modern nationalism I
examine here is, for the most part, opposed to the idea of a centralizing and
homogenizing state. The expositors of this nationalism affirm the primacy of
the nation, as an already existing entity based on shared kinship and custom,
over the state. What is more, the early modern nation is understood as a com-
munity of communities: the towns, cities, estates and provinces, with their
particular customs, privileges, immunities and rights of self-government,
together with their commonalities and their participation in national institu-
tions, are what constitute the nation. As such, they may not be dissolved, nor
their rights significantly curtailed by a national government, whether it is a
monarchy, a representative assembly or a composite of the two forms. In the
Netherlands, municipal and provincial identities were stronger than, for
instance, in neighbouring England, to the point that the provinces were con-
sidered to be sovereign in all matters, except where powers had been dele-
gated to the national government, in the main for the purposes of national
defence. Given the strength of provincial identities and assertions of provin-
cial sovereignty in the Netherlands, the terms ‘nation-state’ or ‘nationalizing
state’, as the modernists understand them, should not, perhaps, be applied to
the Dutch Republic as a whole, but this is not an argument against the exis-
tence of an overarching sense of Dutch nationhood, of belonging to a common
fatherland, as one of the factors that made the United Provinces a viable politi-
cal entity.26 On the contrary, the robustness of provincial self-government
itself and the institutional forms by which it was exercised were among the
constituent elements of the national identity of the Dutch. This was one of
the things that distinguished the inhabitants of the Netherlands from other
nations.
25 Ibid., p. 200.
26 Ernst Gellner associates nationalism with ‘the centralised national state’. See
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 4–6. The term ‘nationalizing state’ signifies a
state engaged in the project of creating a nation-state where one does not yet exist, by
making the state the agent of a particular nationality and assimilating minorities to the
culture of the majority. See Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and
the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge, 2007), p. 63. As Alastair Duke
shows, national identity in the Netherlands on the eve of the Revolt, and afterwards, is
extremely complicated, even ‘elusive’. Yet he concludes that by the time William of
Orange and his propagandists began calling ‘for the deliverance of the “lieve Vaderlant”
[dear Fatherland] from foreign tyrants, they were addressing a constituency that had, for
one reason or another, already begun to think, albeit with difficulty, of the Low Countries
as their “communis patria”, one that could stand alongside their provincial “patriae” ’.
See Alastair Duke, ‘The Elusive Netherlands: The Question of National Identity in the
Early Modern Low Countries on the Eve of the Revolt’, The Low Countries Historical
Review (BMGN), 119 (2004), pp. 10–38, p. 37. Philip Gorski also argues at length that
the Netherlands of the Revolt and later periods did indeed have a national consciousness
consistent with what modern scholars call nationalism. See Gorski, ‘The Mosaic
Moment’.
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If one wishes to speak of political reality in any century, even our own,
‘self-government’ is, admittedly, a problematic term. In a representative form
of government, the people, by definition, do not rule. Thus, some democratic
theorists have said that it is more accurate to call the states of Western Europe
and North America ‘polyarchies’ since political power is in fact shared by a
small portion of the population controlling different parts of government, and
the degree of accountability of government to each citizen is never truly
equal.27 Polyarchy is in fact an apt term for the system of government of the
United Provinces (as the Dutch Republic was often called), in which the sover-
eignty of the people was exercised in each province by representatives of the
nobility and the regents of the towns, and at the federal level by delegates
from the seven provinces who met at the States General. This is not to
say that the Netherlands’ seventeenth- century polyarchy and modern poly-
archies are the same. As Kossmann explains, according to the sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century conception of popular sovereignty ‘sovereignty belongs
not to the individuals who together make up society but to society as a whole,
to a structured set of interrelationships with a historical identity’.28 Popular
sovereignty is understood not as the will of an aggregate of individuals dis-
covered by means of voting, but rather a will mediated through a complex set
of inherited customs, privileges, liberties, relationships and procedures. In
practice this meant that the representatives in the governments of the prov-
inces and in the national government of the Dutch Republic were not chosen
by popular elections. Except in the province of West Friesland where a por-
tion of the population elected deputies, the direct constituents of the deputies
to the States General were the landed nobility and the urban patriciate of all
the towns and cities of the United Provinces.29 Though this is certainly differ-
ent from modern polyarchies, one might well say that in practical terms it is a
difference in degree, not in kind.30 In any event, the real choice in this period
was between polyarchy and monarchy, and this choice had significant conse-
quences. The inequality of power notwithstanding, the freedom of speech and
of the press, together with the religious and economic liberties afforded by the
polyarchical and decentralized Dutch regime, made the United Provinces the
72 E. ALEXANDER-DAVEY
27 See, for instance, Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory: Expanded Edi-
tion (Chicago, 2006).
28 Kossmann, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic, p. 137.
29 Ibid., p. 17.
30 As a variety of social scientists have argued, the advent of universal suffrage and
the decline of old aristocracies notwithstanding, wealthy and powerful classes continue
to have a vastly disproportionate influence on politics in modern polyarchies. For
instance, see C.W. Mills, The Power Elite (New York, 2000); J. McCormick, Machiavel-
lian Democracy (Cambridge, 2011); J. Green, Liberalism and the Problem of Plutocracy
(February 2013), unpublished paper presented at the UW-Madison Political Theory
Workshop.
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GROTIUS’ ANTIQUITY OF THE BATAVIAN REPUBLIC 73
envy of Europe.31 What is more, as I shall demonstrate below, the national
myth popularized by Grotius of the Dutch as descendants of the freedom-loving
Batavians was amenable to eighteenth- century demands for a more demo-
cratic form of representation.
II
The Batavian Myth and the Dutch Revolt
Before turning to Grotius’ invocation of stories of Dutch nationhood, a few
words on the historical context and the genesis of those stories are necessary.
Throughout the Dutch Revolt, defenders of Dutch liberty and independence
cited the chronicles of the various provinces to bolster their case. Each prov-
ince had its own distinctive stories which, as councillor of state Elbertus
Leoninus said in a speech to a meeting of the States General at Antwerp in
1579, ‘are so well-known and still so fresh in our memory that there is no need
to relate them at length’.32
But amid appeals to provincial memories there were also evocations of
national sentiment, a national identity encompassing all the provinces of
the Low Countries. In pamphlets and letters there were references to het
gemeenschappelijke vaderland, the common fatherland, or de Nederlantsche
natie, the Netherlandish nation. William of Orange, in his Apology (1581)
described the inhabitants of the Low Countries as a people with a common
racial and customary heritage distinct from that of the inhabitants of Spain and
other subject provinces of the Spanish Empire. The Dutch were the descendants
of freedom-loving Germans, whose ancient customs of self-government did
not recognize the authority of an absolute monarch, but only a Duke or Count
‘whose power is limited according to our priviledges, which he sware to
observe, at his gladsome entraunce’.33 His son and eventual heir as Stad-
holder, Maurice of Nassau, spoke in a similar vein in a speech in 1595. The
Dutch provinces belonged together, he said, for ‘Between the United Prov-
inces, and the other parts of the Netherlands, there are many things common,
as antient Allyances, right of consanguinity, and the Customs of the places’,
31 For instance, see Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall
1477–1806 (Oxford, 1998), pp. 1–5; and Geoffrey Parker, The Dutch Revolt (Ithaca,
1977), pp. 267–70.
32 E.H. Kossman and A.F. Mellink, Discourse of Elbertus Leoninus, councilor of
State, to the States General at Antwerp: 11 April 1579, in Texts Concerning The Revolt of
the Netherlands, ed. E.H. Kossman and A.F. Mellink (Cambridge, 1975), p. 179.
33 The Apologie of Prince William of Orange Against the Proclamation of the King of
Spaine, ed. H. Wansink (Leiden, 1969), pp. 48, 55. ‘Gladsome entraunce’ is the Eliza-
bethan translator’s rendering of Joyeuse Entrée, which is an allusion to the confirmation
of Joanna as Duchess of Brabant in 1356, and to the charter of liberties she granted to the
province on that occasion.
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but with the Spaniards, that ‘tyrannizing people’, no union, no alliance, not
even a treaty, was possible.34
The Batavian myth has its origins in the early sixteenth century. The
Batavians, an ancient Germanic tribe whose habitations, customs and exploits
are described in the works of Tacitus, piqued the interest of humanist scholars
in the northern Netherlands. In the first several decades of the sixteenth cen-
tury there were earnest disputes about the location of ancient Batavia, of inter-
est because this would determine which of the present inhabitants of the
northern provinces could rightfully claim descent from that illustrious tribe.
Hollanders such as Erasmus and Cornelius Aurelius insisted that only Hol-
landers were descended from the Batavians.35 Other northern Netherlanders
disagreed. For instance, Gerardus Geldenhouwer, a native of Gelderland,
argued variously, that ancient Batavia included all of Germany, that the
Batavians had retained their culture and liberty only in the environs of
Nijmegen, the most important city in his native province, that several cities in
Holland and Utrecht were ‘all probably Batavian’ as well.36
The desire of many scholars in the northern Netherlands to trace the ancestry
of their countrymen to the Batavians is easy to understand. In the ancient
sources, especially the works of Tacitus, the Batavians were praised for their
virtuous way of life, their love of liberty and their ferocity and courage in battle.
All of these qualities are described in one of the most accessible accounts of
the Batavians of the early sixteenth century, the Divisiekroniek of Cornelius
Aurelius, first published in the vernacular in 1517 and reprinted multiple
times throughout the century. Two aspects of Batavian history were espe-
cially pertinent to the Dutch struggle for independence later in the century.
The Batavians, it was claimed, had never been tribute-paying subjects of the
Roman Empire. Their love of liberty, and their valour, had ensured their inde-
pendence from their Roman allies. What is more, as various accounts had it,
when, in the year AD 69, the Romans attempted to subjugate them, the
Batavians, under the leadership of the great Caecilius Bato, also known as
Claudius Civilius, had revolted against the Romans, and thereby restored their
independence.
In the North, and especially in Holland, the Batavians became a very potent
symbol of Dutch liberty in the struggle against Spain. In 1565, a year before
the first uprising against the Spaniards, the States of Holland appointed a his-
torian to record the province’s ancient rights and privileges, especially the
right of summoning the provincial States on their own initiative. Hadrianus
Junius found support for these rights in his research into the history of the
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34 As reported by Grotius, De rebus Belgicis, or, The Annals and History of the
Low-Countrey-warrs (London, 1665), p. 370.
35 See Karin Tilmans, Historiography and Humanism in Holland in the Age of Eras-
mus: Aurelius and the Divisiekroniek of 1517 (Nieuwkoop, 1992), pp. 211–35.
36 Ibid., pp. 259–62.
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Batavians. In 1575, Janus Dousa first drew the connection between the
Batavian revolt against Rome and the Dutch revolt against Spain.37 The city of
Leiden, which had been besieged by the Spaniards in the previous year, but
successfully defended, was rechristened Lugdunum Batavorum to establish
the connection between the heroic defence of the city in modern times and the
struggle for liberty of the ancient Batavians. That the Batavians had become a
broadly popular symbol of Dutch courage and liberty, at least in the North,
is evidenced by the appearance in the 1580s of illustrations depicting father-
liberators of the fatherland, William of Orange and later his heir Count
Maurice of Nassau, side-by-side with the ancient military captain of the
Batavians, Claudius Civilis, who had led the revolt against the Roman legate
to restore Batavian liberty.38 Just as Civilis had liberated the ancient ancestors
of the Dutch, the Batavians, from Roman oppression in the first century AD
and restored their right to self-rule, so would William of Orange (and Count
Maurice) restore the ancient rights and privileges of the Dutch and their free-
dom from domination by the Spaniards.
III
Batavians and Belgians:
Grotius and the Dutch Community of Communities
Dutch national identity in the early modern period is a notoriously compli-
cated subject. Grotius’ own understanding of the political entity that had
arisen from the Revolt against Spanish rule is by no means exceptional in this
regard, which has sometimes led to misunderstanding. It has been claimed,
for instance, that the nationalism or patriotism of Grotius did not exceed the
boundaries of his native Holland, in part on the grounds that he reserved for
Hollanders alone the honour of Batavian ancestry.39 The title of the Dutch
translation of his work, Tractaet Vande Oudtheyt vande Batavische, nu
Hollantsche Republique (Treatise of the Antiquity of the Batavian, now
Hollandish Republic), seems to support this view. However, such claims are
very misleading. In fact, in The Antiquity of the Batavian Republic, and in
other works on politics written in the same period, Grotius identifies with two
communities, the Batavians and the Belgians (Batavi and Belgi), the latter
name encompassing all the people of the Netherlands. One would of course
expect Grotius, himself a native of the most powerful of the United Provinces,
who had, moreover, been appointed the official historiographer of Holland by
37 Waszink, ‘Introduction’, in Grotius, Batavian Republic, p. 9.
38 I. Schöffer, ‘The Batavian Myth during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’,
in Britain and the Netherlands Volume 5: Some Political Mythologies, ed. J.S. Bromley
and E.H. Kossmann (The Hague, 1975), p. 89.
39 Gorski, ‘The Mosaic Moment’, p. 1444; I.L. Leeb, The Ideological Origins of the
Batavian Revolution: History and Politics in the Dutch Republic 1747–1800 (The
Hague, 1973), p. 26.
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the States of Holland and West Friesland, to devote far more attention to the
glories of Holland than to those of the rest of the union. David Miller makes
the obvious point that a strong attachment to a region need not negate a regard
for the larger polity.40 But in this case one can say more than that. Even when
Grotius speaks only of Holland and the Batavians, he is not addressing Hol-
landers alone. Holland for him is, as it were, the most Dutch of the Dutch
provinces; the other members of the union would do well to follow its exam-
ple, which, if they examine themselves, they will find to be consistent with
their own history and customs. In his various political writings from the early
period, although he focuses on Holland, he never fails to point out the shared
Germanic ancestry, the common customs and national characteristics of all
Netherlanders.
In the Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, thought to have been
composed before the Antiquity though never published in Grotius’ lifetime,
the word Batavian is essentially a synonym for Hollander. There are countless
references to Batavian honour, Batavian glory, the Batavian inclination and
talent for commerce, Batavian frugality, the understanding, inherited from the
Batavian ancestors, that the purpose of wealth is the enrichment of the com-
munity, Batavian fortitude and Batavian liberty. But, as Grotius is pleased to
point out, all ‘Belgians’, all the people of the Low Countries, possess these
and other admirable characteristics. Even foreign scholarship pertaining to
the Low Countries attests ‘that the people of these countries are extremely
zealous in the cultivation not of piracy, but of commerce, being moreover free
from every rapacious inclination, superior to all others in sexual temperance
and in their whole way of life, and characterised by the most profound rever-
ence for the laws, for the magistrates, and above all for religion’.41
In the struggle with Spain, he asserts, the Batavians/Hollanders displayed
the most zeal in defence of their ancestral liberties, especially their right to
self-rule through their provincial representative organ, the States of Holland,
which can be traced back ‘to the earliest days of the political entity of Holland’.
But, he continues, the authority of the provincial States is also confirmed by
‘our hereditary laws established originally at Brabant and subsequently intro-
duced to the rest of the Low Countries. For these hereditary precepts expressly
provide that the Assembly shall have full power to refuse all fealty and respect
to a prince who violates the law of the land’.42 What is true of the ancient con-
stitution of Holland is thus true of all the other Dutch provinces; there is a
common law of the land in which Holland participates, attested sometimes by
charters or statutes first adopted in other provinces, and then in Holland. Such
laws are ‘ours’ as much as those unique to Holland. These laws, moreover,
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40 David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford, 1995), p. 25.
41 Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, ed. M.J. van Ittersum (Indian-
apolis, 2006), p. 369.
42 Ibid., p. 395.
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express a love of liberty, and a capacity to defend the same against tyrants,
common to all the Dutch.
Grotius defines Belgium, or the Low Countries, as a federation of peoples,
which he sometimes, interestingly, compares to Spain. Just as Spain is com-
posed of different peoples, Castilians, Leonese, Aragonese and others, so is
the community of the Low Countries composed of Hollanders, Zeelanders,
Frisians and others. ‘Thus,’ he says, ‘the Kingdom of Aragon forms a state
that is distinct from the Kingdom of Castile, notwithstanding the fact that both
kingdoms are subject to one prince. So too, the domain of Holland in itself
constitutes a whole state’, which is to say that Holland, like the other prov-
inces of the union, is sovereign. The provincial estates of each province exer-
cise the sovereign power of the people whom they represent.43 But all also
owe allegiance to the States General, the national or federal representative
body of the union. This second allegiance, Grotius emphasizes, is based not
only on covenant, or tacit consent, but also on custom. The sovereignty of the
States General in the exercise of its delegated powers is ‘supported by com-
mon law’.44 The allegiance of the provinces to one another is not based merely
on a treaty, but on long-standing relationships and a shared Belgian or ‘Low-
lander’ constitutional heritage.
In his other writings, Grotius also underlines the common heritage of all
Netherlanders. In the Antiquity, as I will show in more detail below, Grotius
emphasizes the similarity of the ancient tribes whose descendants now form
the Dutch Republic. Here again, the Batavians are the main heroes of the
story. But there are repeated references to neighbouring tribes, especially the
Frisians and the Mattiaci (thought to be the ancestors of the Zeelanders),
whose constitutional forms, and whose status as sovereign, independent
states, mirror the condition of the ancient Batavians. Interestingly, in the
Antiquity and then in The Annals, Grotius becomes progressively more gener-
ous to the other provinces, at least on the Batavian question: ‘Batavian’ is no
longer a synonym for ‘Hollander’. Breaking with earlier patriots of Holland
such as Cornelius Aurelius, Grotius now extends to other provinces the hon-
our of Batavian ancestry. In the Antiquity, Grotius is somewhat vague: the
Batavians, he says, first established their state on an island ‘which is formed
by the sea and the Rhine’, that is, a territory between the ocean, on one side,
and the two branches of the Rhine, the Nether Rhine and the Ijssel River, on
the other, which would include at least Utrecht and part of Guelders as well as
43 Grotius emphasizes this again in the Antiquity, and in his later tract Verant-
woordingh van de Wettelijcke Regieringh van Hollandt ende West-Vrieslant, 1618 (Jus-
tification of the Lawful Government of Holland and West-Friesland) in defence of the
ancient (i.e. decentralized) political order of the Dutch against the centralizing aspira-
tions of the Stadholder and the National Synod. The first chapter of the latter work asserts
the ‘Souverainiteyt der respective Nederlandtsche Provincien’ (the sovereignty of the
respective Dutch provinces).
44 Grotius, On the Law of Prize and Booty, pp. 392, 410.
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Holland.45 He also notes that after the fall of the Roman empire, and before the
name Hollanders was generally known, the Batavians of the lower part of the
island called themselves Frisians, a name which pleased them ‘either because
in our language it alludes to freedom [Dutch: vrijhied], or because the land of
the Frisians . . . provided a refuge for other Batavians as well’.46 In The
Annals, he declares that Zeeland, together with Holland, is within the territory
that was, ‘in elder times, the most famous Isle of the Batavi, in the middle
between Germany and the Gaules’, and then adds that the ‘beginning . . . of
this Country of old, called Batavia, retains in part its old Name, and is called
Geldres, whose Lordship growing into wideness, is bounded by the River
Maze and Issel’.47 In this description, then, the territory of the ancient Batavians
has expanded somewhat southward so that the ancient nation distinguished by
its valour, fidelity and zeal for liberty, includes at least the present provinces
of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht and Guelders.
This shift on the part of Grotius to a willingness to share Batavian glory
with the other provinces is consistent with a larger trend in the Netherlands in
which the Batavian legacy was first a bone of contention among various prov-
inces, then identified with a few core provinces of the Republic, especially
Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht, and, eventually, with all members of the
union.48 The appeal by Hollanders such as Grotius to the Batavian legacy was
contested by some, but on the whole, in the midst of very serious economic,
political and religious conflicts among the Dutch, Batavia, from a very early
date, was a unifying symbol for the whole Republic.49
IV
Batavian Independence and the Batavian Constitution
In this account of Grotius’ contribution to early modern Dutch nationalism
and constitutionalism it is fitting to focus on the Antiquity of the Batavian
Republic. Of his various works from the period cited here, the Antiquity is
the only one that was published in Dutch — indeed De Jure Praedae and the
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45 Grotius, Batavian Republic, p. 57.
46 Ibid., p. 79.
47 Grotius, The Annals, pp. 66–7.
48 K. Tilmans, ‘The Batavians: Mythical Forefathers of Dutch Republicanism’,
2004, http://karintilmans.nl/pdf/batavians.pdf. Accessed 10 July 2014.
49 The Utrecht scholar Arnoldus Buchelius (1565–1641), for example, objected to
a new edition of De Antiquitate undertaken in 1630 by Petrus Scriverius because in his
view the intention of the work was to bolster the reputation and power of Holland at
the expense of his own province. See Sandra Langereis, Geschiedenis als ambacht:
oudheidkunde in de Gouden Eeuw: Arnoldus Buchelius en Petrus Scriverius (Hilver-
sum, 2001). If, however, one accepts the judgment of Jonathan Israel, such contestation
would be the exception rather than the rule. The capital of the Dutch dominions in the
East Indies was christened Batavia in 1619, he says, because of the ‘unifying connota-
tions’ this name had ‘for the entire Republic’. See Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 323.
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Theses XI were not published at all until centuries later. What is more, by the
standards of its time, this work, as Philip Gorski puts it, was a bestseller. It
also, evidently, fulfilled a pressing need. The treatise was written to justify a
revolt that had already taken place, and a constitutional order that had already,
more or less, taken shape. However, even after the signing of the truce with
Spain in 1609, the position of the Dutch Republic as an independent polity
was by no means secure, and the constitutional order that had arisen was by no
means without powerful critics at home.50 The Dutch Republic did not receive
official recognition as an independent state by the European Great Powers
until the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648.
As Kossmann’s survey of Dutch political thought demonstrates, absolute
monarchy was favoured by many political theorists at Dutch universities in
the early seventeenth century.51 The most magisterial work of political theory
in Dutch in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the Politica of
Justus Lipsius, made powerful arguments for absolute monarchy while Dutch
statesmen continued to struggle with their confederated republican form of
government. Published in 1589, the Politica was, in the judgment of Martin
van Gelderen, ‘above all the most distinguished plea for princely rule and a
powerful repudiation of some of the main arguments employed by Dutch
authors to support the Revolt’. In the first place, whereas other Dutch political
writers of the era had held the honour of ancestors and the liberty of the father-
land to be values upon which no compromise was to the contemplated,
Lipsius emphasized that heaven was the only true fatherland of man, that
earthly fatherlands were subject to natural laws of growth and decline, the for-
tunes and misfortunes of Providence, which no man may resist. Dutch consti-
tutional thought gave clear justifications for resistance to tyranny. Lipsius
declaimed against all supposed rights of resistance and counselled citizens to
‘endure the things present, in hope of amendment’. Finally, Lipsius made no
mention at all of provincial or national assemblies in the governance of king-
doms. His vision of the government was rule by a prince and his advisers,
without any role for an assembly of the estates.52 The new status of the Dutch
provinces as an independent state, and the peculiarity of their constitutional
order, were evidently in need of defenders.
It is significant, then, what sorts of argumentation Grotius employs in this
tract. In De Jure Praedae and the Theses XI, it is true, there are what we could
now call Lockean arguments. In both texts some references are made to ‘sov-
ereign’ (‘	
, free and sui iuris’) individuals in a state nature, who
have a natural right to defend themselves and their property, and who form
50 As Tuck shows (Tuck, Philosophy and Government, pp. 162–4), Grotius himself
was at times critical of the decentralized constitutional order of the Netherlands.
51 Kossmann, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic, pp. 37 ff.
52 van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, p. 187.
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states that said natural liberties may be rendered more secure.53 The constitu-
tions of Holland and the Netherlands as a whole are sometimes justified by
appeals to ‘natural reason’, an agreement of contracting parties based on an
express pledge of allegiance, or tacit consent.54 The general duty of the citizen
to his community is, at times, justified purely on the grounds of the natural
rights and self-interest of individuals. Duty to one’s country, Grotius says at
one point, ‘should take precedence on the ground that it includes the good of
individuals as well. In other words, the cargo cannot be saved, unless the ship
is preserved’.55 One notes that even here Grotius’ analogy is a distinctly Dutch
one: the Hollanders and other Lowlanders, he keeps telling us, are seafaring
peoples, adept at commerce. In any event, it is clear from the composition of
De Jure Praedae and Theses XI that he did not regard argumentation based on
the natural rights and interests of individuals and abstract social contract theory
to be sufficient to inspire zeal for Dutch liberty, or allegiance to the Dutch
constitutional order. As I noted above, there are endless appeals in the former
work to Dutch virtue, and ‘the authority of the laws handed down by our fore-
fathers’.56 Likewise, in the historical chapters of the latter, the sovereignty of
the States of Holland, at least in regard to taxation, is claimed to be from time
immemorial.57 It bears emphasis that in the Antiquity sovereign individuals in
a state of nature are nowhere to be found. The only law of nature mentioned is
that whereby ‘a people of free origins’ is entitled to take possession of unoc-
cupied land.58 Freedom is a thing that belongs to tribes and nations, and to citi-
zens as members of those communities. Citizens are encouraged to defend the
independence and the constitution of their country not because their individ-
ual lives depend on it, but because the memory of ancestors and national hon-
our demand it.
Grotius uses the narrative about the ancient Batavians, and other kindred
Germanic tribes, to convince his countrymen that their seemingly novel status
and constitution are in fact the same status and the same constitution that their
nation has always possessed — that is the essence of his rhetorical strategy.
But within that general approach there are several other important moves
which are typical of nationalist narratives. First, a claim is made about the
common ethnic origin of the people. Stories on the origin of a people invite
conclusions about their fundamental nature, the characteristics of the nation
that do not fluctuate with circumstances because they are, as it were, ‘in their
blood’. Second, there are appeals to the authority of heroes, the best men of
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53 See Grotius, On the Law of Prize and Booty, pp. 33–5, 49–50; Grotius, Com-
mentarius in Theses XI, ed. Peter Borschberg (Berne, 1994), pp. 237, 245.
54 Grotius, Theses XI, p. 223; Grotius, On the Law of Prize and Booty, p. 409.
55 Grotius, On the Law of Prize and Booty, p. 38.
56 Ibid., p. 409.
57 Grotius, Theses XI, p. 275.
58 Grotius, Batavian Republic, p. 57.
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the nation who personify the authentic national character. Third, the struggles
of previous generations are used to appeal to feelings of honour and shame in
the present generation. If the ancestors were willing to sacrifice their private
interests to protect their national way of life, then any less zeal in the present
generation would be treason. Fourth, the values that are denigrated, in this
case, absolute monarchy, are associated with foreigners, those who are alien
to the national family.
Throughout his treatise he emphasizes two things, first, the Batavians’
free, independent and courageous spirit and, second, the constitution that was
an expression of that national spirit and best suited to the preservation of
Batavian liberty, a government by the most eminent members of the two
estates, nobility and people, ‘combined with a principate subjected to laws’.59
Grotius argues that such a constitution is ideal, for it occupies an intermediate
position between a principality and government by the people so as to ‘avert
the negative aspects of both, and combine their good qualities’. Ruling the
nation in concert, the prince and the estates are able to avoid the sorts of mis-
takes that an absolute prince, or an unchecked popular assembly, would be
bound to make. Moreover, such a constitution ‘provides a sufficient degree of
equality when it creates the possibility for anyone from each estate to reach,
on the basis of his abilities, the highest positions and share in power’.60 The
Batavian constitution thus embodies two principles essential to the preserva-
tion of liberty, the principle of checks and balances, and the principle of
equality, which for Grotius means that any member of the nation who distin-
guishes himself and gains the confidence of his fellow citizens may rise to the
highest positions and share in power. The latter principle, as I have noted
above, was not generally realized in the government of the United Provinces.
But by ascribing this principle to the ancient Batavian constitution, Grotius
establishes it as the immemorial tradition of the nation, which later genera-
tions could and indeed would appeal to, against the domination of the second
estate of each of the Dutch provinces by closed oligarchies.61
The question of continuity, of immemoriality, is central to Grotius’ argu-
ment. Friedrich Hayek once wrote — in an entirely different context — that
‘the most effective way of making a people accept the validity of the values
they are to serve is to persuade them that they are really the same as those
which they, or at least the best among them, have always held, but which were
not properly understood or recognised before’.62 This is the essence of Grotius’
approach to persuading his countrymen to support the newly independent
Dutch Republic and its constitution. In doing so, they are not embarking on
59 Ibid., p. 55.
60 Ibid.
61 Kossman is thus not entirely justified in asserting that Grotius’ tract served merely
to preserve the existing order. Kossmann, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic, p. 32.
62 F. Hayek, Road to Serfdom (Chicago, 2007), p. 171.
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something new, not applying a general law or exercising a general right of
humanity, not attempting to put into practice a doctrine arrived at through
sound reasoning from certain infallible first principles. They are merely fol-
lowing what all of their ancestors, or at least the best of them, always knew to
be the right course. Grotius makes this assertion in the form of an extended
metaphor:
If someone contemplates this matter carefully, he will easily find that the
form of government which we now have, has not recently begun with us,
but that the one which previously existed has become more visible. In the
same way in which a house can continue to exist, even if you change one or
more parts, but ceases to exist if you break up the foundations, a constitu-
tion does not immediately become a different one if the names and func-
tions of its magistrates change, as long as the main force of the government
and the supreme power, and the mind, so to speak, that moves and binds the
whole, remain one and the same.63
The metaphor is apt, though certainly not original. As Steven Grosby has
shown, the household or the family is, for obvious reasons, the most common
metaphor for the nation.64 In Grotius’ account, the constitution is the ancestral
house, the structure that protects the national family. Like the family, the
nation has physical and mental essences, blood and memory, which are trans-
mitted from generation to generation. The constitution, like a house, has a
foundation, a structure, which remains essentially the same, although, in the
course of time, certain parts must be repaired, replaced or altered. But out-
ward changes notwithstanding, it is possible for the essence to remain the
same. Grotius portrays the constitution as an indissoluble part of the national
family, which it has transmitted from one generation to the next together with
its blood and its other memories.
By Grotius’ account, the foundations of the constitution are as old as the
foundation of the nation itself. The Batavians, a tribe that broke off from the
Chatti, he says, established their first settled community on an island devoid
of other inhabitants, and made it their own: ‘Now this is the most lawful
beginning of a free state: that the people of free origins founded on free soil.’
At their first settlement, then, the Batavians were a free people, independent
of all others. At this time and after, according to ancient sources, the Batavians
had the same sort of government as the ancient Gauls before the Roman
period: ‘the power of their princes was such that the multitude had no less
power over them, than they over the multitude’. This was the essence of ‘liberty’
as they understood it: the people were not ruled by an absolute monarch, but
by representative assemblies containing their best citizens. This is confirmed
by a speech of Claudius Civilis who said that whereas ‘Oriental peoples’
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(Syria, Asia and the East) ‘belong under a monarchy, the Batavians were natu-
rally unsuited to this form of government’.65 From the earliest origins, then,
the Dutch were a free people. The words of their great ancient hero of national
liberation confirm it. Unlike slavish Oriental peoples who submit to absolute
monarchs, the Batavian ancestors of the Dutch were disposed to freedom by
their nature.
Grotius cites several passages from Tacitus’ work on the ancient Germans
to fill out the picture of the ancient Batavian government as a mixed constitu-
tion in which kings or commanders ruled together with assemblies of the peo-
ple. The Batavians were a Germanic tribe, and therefore one could say of them
what Tacitus had said of the Germans on the whole, ‘that the Kings of the Ger-
mans “had no unlimited or arbitrary power”; and [Tacitus] even adds that in
an assembly, they were listened to “for their convincing power, rather than for
their competence to give orders” ’.66 Kings, in fact, were rare. More often,
there were only commanders appointed by the assembly to prosecute specific
wars, an election that was marked by a specific ritual, the raising up of the
commander on a shield on the shoulders of the electors. Claudius Civilis him-
self was one such commander. At this point, Grotius also emphasizes that the
elective nature of kingship was not only a Batavian custom, but also one
upheld and preserved through the ages by those neighbouring peoples who
now, together, form the Dutch Republic, for instance the Frisians: ‘when
[circa 1345] negotiations were attempted just before the start of the battle
between the Frisians and the last William of the house of Hainault, the
Frisians offered this condition among others to the Count, that four of the
most noble Frisians would balance him on a shield on their shoulders,
exclaiming: This is the power of Friesland’.67
The essential point, from Grotius’ point of view, was that among the
Batavians and their neighbours, the commander-in-chief, whether a king or a
temporary commander, had limited authority:
Since both were limited, they were necessarily defined within limits. These
limits were imposed by law and the power of others. The law imposes
restrictions, as Tacitus calls it, and when the power of others is added, the
situation is created in which one rules at the request of others, not in his own
right. The laws were not written down, but, like the Spartan laws, were
effective through their position in memory and long-standing use.68
The Batavians, Frisians and others, then, ruled themselves in accordance with
the laws of a mixed constitution. They did not generally require kings, except
in an emergency, and at assemblies, kings did not give orders. They must
attempt to persuade the people that their proposed course of action was best,
65 Grotius, Batavian Republic, pp. 57, 59.
66 Ibid., p. 59.
67 Ibid., pp. 59, 63.
68 Ibid., p. 59.
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and leave the decision to the people. The kings were also limited by the estab-
lished laws of the community, maintained through the generations in memory
and custom. In Grotius’ account, then, the ancestors are shown to have taken
an active role in the government: kings ruled at their request, and in accor-
dance with their laws.
In its form, the present government of Holland, as well as those of many of
the other provinces, resembled the ancient government of the Batavians, with
the provincial States, the sovereign assembly composed of the most eminent
members of the nobility and deputies from the towns, the smaller standing
committee appointed by the States to carry out their decisions, and the Stad-
holder, who commanded the army and navy and exercised other executive
powers in the state. According to Tacitus, the Germanic peoples ‘had a system
of two councils: a small council, in which everyday matters and the more fre-
quently occurring ones were dealt with, and which consisted of the princes
only; and a large council, which held the supreme power, and consisted of
both estates’. It is clear, continues Grotius, that ‘with this council . . . which
consisted of both estates, the highest power resided’. The Batavians also had
precisely this form of government:
The history of Civilis shows that the Batavians did indeed have the very
form of government we are now discussing: in order to have the war against
the wrongdoings of the Romans declared in proper form, Civilis ‘convoked
the nobility of the tribe and the most prominent from the people’, which
words provide us with clear evidence of the existence of both estates.
Thus, the government of the Batavians was composed of a prince, who was
either a permanent king or a commander in wartime, and two estates, ‘the
nobles, who were also called peers or princes, and those chosen from the com-
mon people’.69 An objective modern historian might well say that in the
course of the Revolt, the governments of Holland and the other Dutch prov-
inces were ‘fundamentally altered’.70 But on Grotius’ account, the constitu-
tional changes that occurred, with Holland serving in many cases as a model
for the other provinces, were not innovations, but a restoration of the ancient
governments of the Dutch, whose most shining example was that of the
Batavians.
The relations of the Batavians to the Romans provide more evidence of the
ancient constitutional order of the Batavians. In the telling of Grotius, and of
other writers whose works were published before and during the Dutch
Revolt, the revolt of the Batavians against Roman tyranny supplies a signal
example of Dutch courage, love of freedom, and status of the Dutch people as
an independent sovereign nation. The Batavians, Grotius insists, never were
conquered by the Roman Empire, and therefore never had been its subjects:
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‘It is reasonable . . . to believe that the Batavians respected Roman power, but
did not submit to them. This is indicated by the word association, which
Tacitus uses in the passage just mentioned, and more precisely an honourable
association, since he says: “they retain the honourable badge of an ancient
alliance”.’
Tacitus, he says, had remarked that although such associations between
unequal parties usually degenerated into a predatory relationship in which the
superior power enjoyed all the benefits, this had not been the case with the
Batavians, who had achieved, ‘through their inborn virtue and loyalty, the
retention of their associated position — that is, their equality and rights — not
only in theory, but also in fact’. In further confirmation of the independence
of the Batavian nation, he writes:
Civilis, in his oration to the people, says that no Roman governor has ever
come to the Batavians. Instead, they govern their own state with their own
laws in their own magistrates; so they were never counted among the prov-
inces. On the contrary, Tacitus often mentions ‘the Batavian nation’, ‘the
congregation of the Batavians’, ‘the community of the Batavians’, with
which words he refers to nothing else than what we today call an independ-
ent state.
The Batavians were a cohesive, independent nation, not only conscious of
their rights and freedoms, but able, through their inborn virtue, to retain them
in spite of the pressure from their large ally to the South. Such also, he notes,
according to the ancient sources, was the condition of the Mattiaci, ‘neigh-
bours of the Batavians’ whose ancestors were also the Chatti.71 The Mattiaci
also, then, ancestors of many of the other inhabitants of the Low Countries,
were of such fortitude that they maintained their independence in spite of the
Roman Empire.
When the Romans attempted to treat the Batavians as a subject people,
rather than as an ally, this was occasion for revolt:
At that moment, however, when the Romans changed from using auxiliary
troops to raising troops by recruitment, and not only greedily carried out
this recruitment, but also added to it the disgrace of atrocities, which it was
impossible for free-born men to bear, the Batavians did what brave men
must do, that is, they took up arms, in order to defend their freedom and
their purity.
Grotius emphasizes the tenacity with which the Batavians resisted Roman
aggression in defence of their native freedom:
From the history of these wars, it appears how eager the Batavians were to
defend their freedom, in defence of which they have not shrunk from chal-
lenging the Roman power and the fifteen legions surrounding them. Thus,
‘the name of Rome was driven from the island of the Batavians’: and the
71 Grotius, Batavian Republic, pp. 69, 71.
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Batavians themselves ‘enjoyed great fame all from Germany and Gaul as
the founders of freedom’.
Not only did the Batavians regain their independence in the event, and estab-
lish a reputation for themselves as courageous lovers of freedom, which
remained unbroken through the ages in spite of the attempts of other nations
to conquer them. They in fact absorbed some other kindred Germanic tribes
into their community, and formed close associations with others, including
the Mattiaci and the Frisians. Though records for some five hundred years of
history were absent, one could assume that the Batavians and other kindred
tribes who, together, eventually came to call themselves Hollanders, pre-
served their independence. In any event, the first Counts of Holland were free
from any foreign obligation. Some Counts of Holland may have invoked the
protection of the ‘German Emperors’, but this could never affect ‘the inde-
pendent position of the state or its later princes’. ‘Holland,’ he declares, ‘has
never been subject to the laws and decisions of the Emperors and the
Empire’.72
The Batavians/Hollanders did more than preserve their national sover-
eignty. According to Grotius, they, as well as their neighbours, the Frisians,
Mattiaci and others, also maintained their old laws and freedoms in succeed-
ing generations. They kept more or less the same political traditions, just as
they had preserved other old customs. This is evident from a review of medi-
eval treaties and statutes which, he says, are to be accounted as a written
expression of the immemorial customs of their ancient progenitors. Grotius
lists the essential features of the constitution of Holland:
The most important laws regarding the government were the following: a
female prince shall not marry without the consent of the States of Holland;
the offices of counselor, steward and sheriff shall not be given to foreigners;
the States shall have the right to congregate as often as they want and wher-
ever they want, and shall not need the permission of the prince to do this;
only the States shall decide whether new taxes will be levied, whether
someone will be exempted from paying them; the prince shall not be per-
mitted to start a war to defend the interests of the country or to prosecute
wrongdoings without the permission of the States; the princes shall use the
Dutch language in their official papers; the prince shall coin money, and
change the coinage according to what the States decide circumstances
require; it shall not be possible for the prince to renounce any part of his
princedom; it shall not be permitted to convoke a congregation of the States
outside the country; if the prince needs a grant or contribution, he shall ask
these from the States in person, and not by means of an agent. He shall not
demand taxes if these are not voluntarily given; justice shall only be admin-
istered by ordinary judges; the ancient laws and customs shall not be vio-
86 E. ALEXANDER-DAVEY
72 Ibid., pp. 73–5, 75, 87.
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
16
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
GROTIUS’ ANTIQUITY OF THE BATAVIAN REPUBLIC 87
lated; if the prince decrees anything that is in contradiction with those, no
one shall be held to obey the decree.73
According to immemorial tradition, then, the sovereignty of the nation lies
with the States. The prince is not to declare war or raise taxes without the con-
sent of the States. He cannot interfere with the ordinary administration of jus-
tice by the courts. He cannot violate the ancient laws and customs of the land,
and if he should decree anything in contravention of those laws, the States and
the people are at liberty to disregard it. All of these constitutional stipulations
are drawn from the immemorial experience of the nation. What is more, the
constitution demands certain privileges for its native sons. Counsellors, stew-
ards and sheriffs cannot be foreigners. The official papers of the government
must be written in the Dutch language. All of these constitutional stipulations,
he argues, were in existence long before they were written down in the instru-
ment signed by Maria of Burgundy in 1477, known as the Great Privilege,
which was granted to Flanders, Brabant and Hainaut, as well as to Holland.
The original constitution of Holland, and of the other provinces, is thus a
contract between prince and people, which remains valid in spite of the fact
that Counts of Holland in later times usually ascended to the throne by heredi-
tary right. The hereditary rights of royal princes did not undo the rights of the
States and the people:
Although succession in Holland followed the lines of paternal dissent, no
one was accepted as prince before he had taken an oath before the States to
observe the laws and customs of the country, in order to indicate that the
basis of governmental power was not paternal inheritance but the consent of
the people, that is, of the States. When this was done, loyalty and obedience
were promised in return to the prince who had promised to govern on the
basis of the laws.
The contractual nature of this constitution is not a mere theory; it has been
confirmed by many precedents, which Grotius proceeds to cite at length, fill-
ing several pages with descriptions of past instances in which the medieval
Counts of Holland were confirmed, and sometimes deposed, by the authority
of the States.74 Throughout the ages then, the Dutch showed that they were
both willing and able to assert their rights, and depose princes who violated
them.
The union of Holland with the other provinces of the Northern Netherlands
is a confederation wherein each province remains sovereign, but by Grotius’
account it is based on ties much deeper than any treaty. As descendants of the
Batavians and associated ancient German tribes such as the Mattiaci and the
Frisians, the other member states of the Union of Utrecht — Gelderland,
Zeeland, Utrecht, Friesland, Overijssel and Groningen — had, as he points
73 Ibid., p. 89.
74 Ibid., pp. 91, 91–5.
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
16
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
out repeatedly, similar traditions of self-government and essentially the same
relations with the Stadholder, who was often the same man in several or all of
the provinces. On Grotius’ account then, the union of these provinces, all
populated by kindred tribes, with similar national characters, goes back to
ancient times. They all have long had the same ‘custom of sending representa-
tives in order to consult with each other about the common interest. The
assembly consisting of these representatives is rarely dissolved, and is called
the States General’.75
This whole constitutional order continued undisturbed for many centuries,
as long as the people respected the prince and the prince ‘continued to respect
the laws and the meetings of the people’. Order was disturbed, however, when
foreign princes with interests and bases of power outside the Netherlands,
ascended to the office of lord of the Dutch provinces. Corruption of Dutch
constitutionalism and Dutch virtue was introduced by contact with foreigners.
As Grotius puts it ‘the ancient princes, whose every prospect lay within their
own country, and who had no foreign power to call in, showed themselves
obedient to the laws, admirers of justice, and respectful of the States because
they understood that their own position was founded on the States’ financial
assistance’. Here Grotius emphasizes the financial dependence of the prince
on the States General as a check on executive tyranny. But, by his account,
foreign manners also played a role in the corruption of the Dutch government.
The Burgundians, being descendants of kings, and as such unaccustomed to
the limits that Netherlanders place on their princes, ‘made the first step
towards absolute rule’. After them, Charles V committed serious abuses, ‘but
he restrained himself out of love for these regions, since he was born and
brought up here . . . and knew . . . the character of the people’, especially the
jealousy with which they guarded their freedom. But his son Philip was raised
as a Spaniard, and thus, in the service of that nation’s interests and operating
on the assumptions of a foreign culture, attempted to impose on the Nether-
landers something that they could not brook, an absolutist form of government
administered by foreigners. This constituted a violation of the sovereignty of
the Netherlanders and all their ancient rights.76
It was, therefore, on account of his violation of his agreement to govern
according to the traditions of the Netherlanders that King Philip II of Spain
was justly deposed as Count of Holland in 1581, and the other provinces of
the Netherlands. Grotius lists the well-known grievances against the King
of Spain: first, he had changed the administration of the provinces and begun
issuing decrees from Spain without consulting the States; then he had attempted
to impose an Inquisition on the provinces, and when the nobles requested that
the question of ecclesiastical administration be settled by the States General,
he forbade the holding of such a meeting; finally, he had sent the Duke of Alva
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as governor of the Netherlands to establish ‘absolute rule’ and abrogate ‘all
rights and customs of the people’. In response to these violations and acts of
aggression, the Dutch did what their ancestors had done: ‘Following the
example of their ancestors, who took up arms against the Romans who tried to
secure domination, they declared war on Alva.’ When it became manifest that
none of their petitions and admonitions would move the King, the States Gen-
eral ‘declared Philip deposed from the principate in accordance with the law
itself, because of his violation of the laws regarding the extent of his power’.77
The essential point here is clear: Grotius’ defence of liberty and constitu-
tionalism is delivered by means of a typical nationalist narrative. He advo-
cates the preservation of a particular constitutional form by telling a story about
wise and courageous ancestors who fended off powerful foreign aggressors to
protect their way of life and pass it on to the next generation. Just as their
ancient ancestors, the Batavians, repelled the onslaught of the world’s great-
est empire, Rome, so did the Hollanders and other Netherlanders wrench their
independence and freedom back from the grandest empire of their time, that
of the Spaniards. In conclusion, then, Grotius declares the preservation of this
independence and constitutional freedom the sacred duty of all Dutchmen:
Therefore, we owe much to our ancestors, who have accepted a form of
government, which was excellent in itself, and ideal for our character and
ambitions, from the original founders, preserved it in peace time, recovered
it by war, and passed it on to us. It is now our duty, if we do not want to be
ungrateful or imprudent, firmly to defend this form of government, which is
urged by reason, approved by experience, and recommended by antiquity.78
With his Batavian narrative, Grotius defended Dutch liberty as no strictly
Lockean philosopher could, appealing not only to ‘reason’, but also to con-
crete experience, and to the non-rational component of human consciousness,
the tribal or national instinct, the desire for continuity and community, the
memory of ancestors, the admiration of heroes.
Conclusion
Apart from objections to nationalism itself, there is another objection to the
form of political theory I have been describing here: that it is inherently con-
servative and undemocratic.79 But, as I suggested at the outset, Grotius’
Batavian narrative was entirely amenable to a more democratic interpretation.
77 Ibid., pp. 99–101, 103, 105.
78 Ibid., p. 115.
79 This, as I noted before, is Kossman’s reason for dismissing Grotius’ Batavian tract.
James Tully makes the same sort of argument against the ‘political holism’ of the English
thinker George Lawson. Focus on the past and tradition, he says, supports oligarchy,
whereas Lockean ‘political individualism’ points ineluctably to equality and universal
suffrage. James H. Tully, ‘Current Thinking on Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century
Political Theory’, Historical Journal, 24 (1981), pp. 475–84, pp. 480–3; James Tully,
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Grotius had said that one of the main principles of the Batavian constitution
was equality, which meant that anyone who distinguished himself and gained
the confidence of his peers could rise to the highest offices in the land and
have a share in power. In the eighteenth century, the Dutch Patriot Party
sought, among other things, broader popular participation in the government
of the Netherlands, which was justified by appeals to the ancient constitution
and the legacy of the Batavians.80 Derk van der Capellen framed his appeal as
follows:
O, compatriots, take up arms, all of you, and take care of the affairs of the
whole country, that is, your own affairs. The country belongs to all of you
and not to the prince with his highly placed clients who regard and treat you,
all of us, the whole Dutch people, the descendants of the free Batavians, as
if they were their heritable property, their oxen and sheep which they may
sheer or slaughter at will. The people living in a country, the inhabitants, the
townsmen and peasants, the poor and rich, the great and small, all of them
together are the real owners, the lords and masters of the country and they
can say how they want things to be arranged, how and by whom they wish to
be governed.81
According to van der Capellen, all Dutch people were the descendants of the
illustrious free Batavians and, as such, all members of the nation inherited that
ancient virtue and liberty and thus were capable of and entitled to participate
in governing the nation.
Grotius’ Antiquity of the Batavian Republic provides a powerful illustra-
tion of the relationship between popular sovereignty, constitutionalism and
nationalism. Popular sovereignty logically requires a pre-political commu-
nity, the substance of which usually has been particularistic memories of the
nation. Natural rights discourse cannot define who the people are, or prescribe
a workable constitutional form. It also lacks the emotive appeal of a story
about wise and courageous ancestors who were able to preserve their liberty
through the ages, in spite of the depredations of hostile foreigners. The long
enduring popularity of the Batavian and other national myths, suggests that
twenty-first century liberal nationalists may be right to question whether
constitutional self-government can be established or maintained without a
common national cultural legacy both for solidarity among its citizens and
attachment to a particular constitutional discipline. The attempt to purify the
nation of these particularistic attachments may risk weakening the bonds of
citizenship and the constitutional order. Those of the Rawlsian and
90 E. ALEXANDER-DAVEY
‘Locke’, in The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450–1700, ed. J.H. Burns with
the assistance of M. Goldie (Cambridge, 1991), p. 622.
80 Though it is true that some opponents of broader political participation cited
Grotius himself as a defender of patrician rule. See M.J. van Ittersum, ‘Confronting
Grotius’ Legacy in an Age of Revolution: The Cornets de Groot Family in Rotterdam,
1748–98’, English Historical Review, 127 (2012), pp. 1367–1403, p. 1392.
81 Quoted in Kossmann, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic, p. 187.
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Habermasian schools would like political discourse in liberal democracies to
be framed solely in terms of principles and reasons that can be justified from
the standpoint of all human beings. But this may be an unrealistic expectation.
It seems a near certainty in any event that, the prescriptions of liberal political
philosophers notwithstanding, in competitive democratic politics, politicians
and political writers of all ideological stripes will go on using the evocative
power of nationalism whenever it suits them. Those who defend constitu-
tional government would thus be unwise to discount the power and the useful-
ness of nationalism.
Ethan Alexander-Davey UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
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